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Complexity is the greatest challenge to 21
st
 Century financial regulation, having 
the potential to impair markets and investments in several interrelated ways. 
Furthermore, complexity can cause failures that individual market participants cannot, 
or will not have incentive to, remedy. These failures are driven by information 
uncertainty, misalignment of interests and incentives among market participants, and 
nonlinear feedback and tight coupling that result in sudden unexpected market changes. 
These are the same types of failures that engineers have long faced when working with 
complex engineering systems. The lecture uses engineering solutions such as chaos 
theory to examine how financial regulation should be structured to correct those failures.
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In recent articles, I have argued that most of the causes of the global 
financial crisis can be divided conceptually into the categories of conflicts, 
complacency, complexity, and a type of tragedy of the commons. I 
sometimes refer to these as the „3Cs and the TOC.‟ One might propose a 
fourth „C‟: cupidity, or greed. But greed is so ingrained in human nature and 
so intertwined with the other categories that it adds little insight to view it as 
a separate category. Government cannot meaningfully legislate against 
greed. Moreover, in moderation, greed is positive, stimulating trade and 
commerce through the profit motive. 
 
   My talk today is on complexity, which I regard as the greatest 21
st
 
Century challenge for our financial system.  
 
   Complexity in financial markets does not necessarily “arise for 
complexity‟s sake, nor from a desire to obfuscate.”  Rather, it arises in 
response to “demand by investors for securities that meet their investment 
criteria and their appetite for ever higher yields” and in order to facilitate the 
transfer and trading of risk to those who prefer to hold it, promoting 
efficiency.  
 
Nonetheless, complexity can also impair markets and investments in 
several interrelated ways.  
 
A. Complexities of the Assets Underlying Investment Securities, and 
of the Means of Originating those Assets  
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The complexities of the assets underlying investment securities, and 
of the means of originating those assets, can lead to a failure of lending 
standards and unanticipated defaults. Consider the complexities of the 
underlying assets, which can include mortgage loans and a wide range of 
other financial assets. Each type of underlying asset requires a separate 
approach to modeling, including estimation of default risk, interest rate risk, 
and prepayment risk. To further complicate matters, prepayment risk is 
correlated with interest rate risk: when rates fall, borrowers are more likely 
to prepay; and when rates rise, borrowers are more likely to default. These 
risks are also dynamic in that they fluctuate over time.  
 
The complexities of the means of originating these assets also can 
lead to a failure of lending standards. For example, the originate-to-
distribute model of mortgage lending, under which mortgage lenders would 
sell off loans as they were made, is believed to have contributed to the 
financial crisis—although at tomorrow‟s lecture I will question that belief.  
 
Next consider complexities of the securities backed by these assets.   
 
B. Complexities of Modern Investment Securities  
The financial crisis involved mortgage-backed securities. Because 
they are somewhat representative of modern investment securities, I will use 
them as a model, to provide perspective. 
 
In their most basic form, mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”) are 
issued by a special-purpose vehicle (“SPV”), and payment on the securities 
is derived directly from collections on mortgage loans owned by the SPV. 
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More complex forms of mortgage-backed securities include collateralized 
debt obligation (“CDO”) securities, in which payment derives directly from 
a mixed pool of mortgage loans and sometimes, also, other financial assets 
owned by the SPV; and ABS CDO securities, in which payment derives 
from MBS and CDO securities owned by the SPV (and thus indirectly from 
the mortgage loans and other financial assets underlying those securities).  
 
Complexities of Securities Can Impair Disclosure.  Complexity can 
deprive investors and other market participants of the understanding needed 
for markets to operate effectively. Even if all information about a complex 
structure is disclosed, complexity increases the amount of information that 
must be analyzed in order to value the investment with certainty. According 
to rational ignorance theory, there is a point at which the benefit obtained 
from additional analysis can be outweighed, or at least appear to be 
outweighed, by the costs of performing that analysis.  
 
The complexity of many modern investment securities appears to 
exceed that point. Investment analysts thus often resort to simplifying 
heuristics, such as credit ratings, as substitutes for attempting to fully 
understand the investments being analyzed. 
 
Complexities of Securities Can Obfuscate Consequences.  When 
securities are highly complex, parties reviewing, or even structuring, the 
securities may not always appreciate all the consequences. The complexities 
of securities also can obfuscate consequences when payoffs are linked to 
unrelated events, or “nonlinear.” For example, derivative instruments can 
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have payoffs that are not linearly related to the prices of their underlying 
securities. 
 
The complexities of securities can also obfuscate consequences when 
trying to assess investment risk. With limited time to devote to this task, a 
firm‟s senior managers often want risk to be modeled and reduced to useable 
numbers. Any model, however, can be manipulated.  
 
For example, as the VaR, or value-at-risk, model for reducing 
investment risk to a number became more accepted, banks began 
compensating analysts not only for generating profits but also for generating 
profits with low risks, measured by VaR. Analysts then began to select 
securities, such as complex forms of MBS and credit-defaults swaps, that 
have high rates of return and only rarely have losses. Because the likelihood 
of these losses was less than the risk percentages taken into account under 
VaR modeling—which typically excludes losses that have less than a one-
percent (or, in some cases, five-percent) likelihood of occurring within the 
model‟s limited time frame—such losses were not included in the VaR 
computations. Analysts knew but did not always make clear to senior 
management that in the rare cases where such losses occurred, they could be 
huge. 
 
Complexities of Securities Can Make Financial Markets More 
Susceptible to Financial Contagion.  The complexities of securities can 
make financial markets more susceptible to financial contagion. In the recent 
crisis, for example, overreliance on “investment grade” ratings—as a 
substitute for trying to understand the complexity—meant that when certain 
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investment-grade securities starting losing money, investors panicked 
fearing that other investment-grade rated securities would likewise default.  
 
 Complexities of Securities Can Make Financial Markets More 
Susceptible to Fraud.  Complexity also can facilitate fraud, especially in the 
case of complex asset-backed securities transactions. When a company 
issues corporate bonds, investors purchase the bonds based on the 
company‟s ability to repay, which ties strongly to the company‟s reputation 
for financial integrity and governance. Although there certainly have been 
frauds where the reality belied the company‟s reputation, a reputation built 
up slowly is hard to fake.  
 
The use of asset-backed securities, however, enables even companies 
without good public reputations to obtain capital-market financing indirectly 
by using their financial assets. Although much is done to monitor these 
assets, due-diligence monitoring is not foolproof because it does not 
micromanage all uses and sources of cash and also because the servicer is 
not usually independent of the company.  
 
C. Complexities of Modern Financial Markets 
 The complexities of modern financial markets can aggravate these 
failures. Financial markets are effectively complex networks comprised of 
individual firms and markets that are both interconnected and interactive. 
The most straightforward interconnection is through contracting, such as 
derivatives contracts. The failure of a given market participant can cause a 
default on its obligations to other market participants, who, in turn, may 
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default on their own obligations to yet other market participants, leading to a 
domino-effect collapse. 
 
 The ability of modern financial markets to transmit information 
rapidly, often instantaneously, exemplifies market interactivity. This „tight 
coupling‟ can exacerbate the impact of information failure or uncertainty. 
For example, newly developed trading technologies have greatly increased 
the speed of processing and trading on information. High-frequency 
algorithmic trading systems, relying on computerized models, are now 
capable of analyzing vast quantities of market data and transmitting 
thousands of order messages per second. Because of the speed with which 
this trading occurs, erroneous trades can lead to substantial losses before 
they are discovered. Furthermore, automated stop-loss orders based on pre-
set criteria can trigger a chain reaction of selling, without the time or 
opportunity for human judgment to intervene. 
 
 In this type of complex environment, regulation can easily lead to 
unintended consequences. Mark-to-market, or “fair value,” accounting, for 
example, is generally believed to reduce risk. Nonetheless, it can cause 
perverse effects on systemic stability during times of market turbulence. As 
the recent crisis showed, forcing sales of assets to meet margin calls can 
depress asset prices, requiring more forced sales (which, in turn, will depress 
asset prices even more), causing a downward spiral. 
 
 How should these failures resulting from complexity be addressed? 
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ADDRESSING MARKET FAILURES RESULTING FROM 
COMPLEXITY 
 
These failures are, broadly, driven by (a) information uncertainty, (b) 
nonlinear feedback and tight coupling, and (c) misalignment of interests and 
incentives among market participants. These types of failures are similar to 
those that engineers have long faced when working with complex systems 
that have nonlinear feedback effects. Moreover, many characteristics of 
complex engineering systems are similar to those of financial markets.  
 
For these reasons, any analysis of market failures resulting from 
complexity should take into account the “chaos theory” that helps to inform 
engineers about complex systems with nonlinear feedback effects. 
 
A. Addressing Information Failures Arising from Uncertainty  
Uncertainty can cause a variety of financial-market failures, most 
obviously impairing securities disclosure. There are several potential ways 
to deal with this impaired disclosure: (i) to tolerate it; (ii) to prohibit 
transactions with impaired disclosure or otherwise attempt to reduce 
uncertainty; and (iii) to implement supplemental protections to minimize the 
impairment.  
 
Toleration does not work because impaired disclosure makes 
securities markets inefficient. Prohibiting transactions with impaired 
disclosure does not work because it would inadvertently ban many beneficial 
transactions.   
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Regulatory attempts to limit uncertainty are unlikely to work. The 
most obvious approach would be to attempt to standardize financial 
products. But standardization would undermine the efficiencies that arise 
when securities are tailored to the particular needs of investors. Even the 
Dodd-Frank Act in the United States, which attempts to require centralized 
clearing and settlement of derivative contracts in order to manage 
counterparty risk, recognizes that the standardization needed to effectuate 
centralized clearing and settlement should not include all derivatives.    
 
Implementing cost-effective supplemental protections therefore 
appears to be the best approach to the problem of impaired disclosure. These 
protections could include guaranties by sellers, such as warranties; and 
certifications of quality.  
 
In a limited sense, the Dodd-Frank Act mandates a form of seller 
“guaranty,” by requiring sellers of mortgage- and other asset-backed 
securities to hold minimum unhedged exposure to the securities being sold. 
In this way, the seller puts “skin in the game” to signal its belief in the safety 
of the securities. This approach, however, can sometimes backfire.  
 
For example, prior to the financial crisis, underwriters customarily 
purchased some “first loss” portion of the subordinated “equity” tranches of 
ABS CDO securities to demonstrate their belief in the securities being sold. 
Unfortunately, at least some of these underwriters did not fully understand 
the risks associated with their retained tranches, resulting in what I referred 
to yesterday as a „mutual misinformation‟ problem; by signaling its 
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(unjustified) confidence in the securities being sold, the seller inadvertently 
misleads investors into buying those securities.  
 
Certifications of quality can also improve securities disclosure, 
especially where the certification achieves an economy of scale. This type of 
approach is currently employed, for example, through rating-agency ratings 
on debt securities. In the recent crisis, however, rating agencies were said to 
contribute to the crisis.  
 
There are no perfect solutions to the problem of uncertainty. 
Government already mandates minimum investor sophistication for 
investing in complex securities, yet the most sophisticated financial 
institutions are the very investors who lost the most money in the global 
financial crisis.  
 
 B. Addressing Failures Arising from Nonlinear Feedback and Tight 
Coupling 
 Perhaps the most significant combination of nonlinear feedback and 
tight coupling has been marking to market. The downward spiral it caused 
could have been mitigated, if not prevented, by recognizing that when 
investors lose confidence and markets become turbulent, marking to market 
can be misleading and potentially dangerous. One possible solution, for 
example, would be to allow a firm otherwise required to mark to market to 
have the option, instead, to disseminate full disclosure of its underlying asset 
portfolio.  
 
 Leverhulme Lecture-Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets FINAL.DOC 
11 
As financial markets evolve, other nonlinear feedback effects will 
undoubtedly become tightly coupled in ways one cannot predict ex ante. It is 
also impossible to know precisely how future financial crises will arise. 
Consideration therefore should be given to more “broad spectrum” 
regulatory solutions.  
 
One such possible approach is to establish a governmental entity to 
act, if needed, as a market liquidity provider of last resort in order to more 
loosely couple the feedback effects. This approach takes inspiration from 
chaos theory, which recognizes that failures are almost inevitable in complex 
systems, and that most successful systems are those in which the 
consequences of a failure are limited. This approach is also consistent with 
engineering design, in which de-coupling systems through modularity helps 
to reduce the chance that a failure in one part of a complex system will 
systemically trigger a failure in another part. When a component of a system 
fails, modularity enables repairs to be made before the entire system shuts 
down.  
 
A market liquidity provider of last resort could work in much this 
same way: not only reducing the chance of any given financial market 
collapse by restoring liquidity but also reducing systemic risk by de-
coupling the chance that a failure in one market would trigger a failure in 
other markets.   
 
I will not go into the details of how such a market liquidity provider 
could work because I discussed that yesterday, when I introduced the idea. I 
would only observe further that the role of a market liquidity provider of last 
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resort would go substantially beyond the U.S. Federal Reserve‟s historical 
actions as lender of last resort to financial institutions, much less the actions 
of other national central banks. 
 
C. Addressing Failures Arising from Misalignment of Incentives 
Complexity causes several types of misalignment that can give rise to 
financial-market failures. Consider first misalignment caused by the 
originate-to-distribute model. 
 
A moral hazard problem arises because this model misaligns the 
interests of lenders with the interests of the ultimate owners of the loans. In 
theory, separation of origination and ownership should not matter because 
ultimate owners should assess and value risk before buying their ownership 
positions. Even though lenders are better situated to make this evaluation 
than the ultimate owners, the latter should take steps to reduce, or to 
compensate for, this information asymmetry. The recent crisis demonstrates, 
however, that practice can diverge from theory in this context because of the 
complexity of disclosure, the tendency of investors to engage in herd 
behavior, and the possible excessive diversification of risk that undermines 
any given investor‟s incentive to monitor and see the big picture.  
 
As one solution to the moral hazard problem caused by this 
misalignment, regulators could (and in the U.S. and, I believe, Europe they 
now do) require loan originators to retain some realistic risk of loss—the 
“skin in the game” that I previously mentioned. Unfortunately, this solution 
still faces the mutual misinformation problem. 
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Misalignment can also cause failure in the form of fraud. For 
example, current best-practice monitoring procedures in asset-backed 
securities transactions are not failsafe because the servicer is not usually 
independent of the company originating the underlying financial assets. An 
affiliated servicer can manipulate monitoring in ways that are undetectable 
unless investors, or their agents, micromanage all uses and sources of cash.  
 
In practice, asset-backed securities transactions may evolve to use 
independent, third-party servicers, in order to increase investor comfort. But 
regulation should not impose that requirement; parties should have the 
flexibility to decide, for example, not to use an independent servicer when 
they trust an affiliated servicer. There is nothing inherently wrong or unusual 
for parties in business transactions to deal with each other on the basis of 
trust.  
 
Nonetheless, the potential for government to impose that requirement 
can be valuable because investors tend to have short memories. Experience 
has shown that once a crisis recedes in memory, they will almost always 
tend to “go for the gold.” There may come a time when regulation, or its 
threat, is needed to restore market discipline. 
 
Finally, misalignment can cause failure when conflicts exist among a 
firm‟s managers, such as when investment analysts resort to simplifying 
heuristics when analyzing highly complex securities or—as in the case of 
VaR—manipulate models for their pecuniary advantage. This “secondary-
manager” conflicts problem can be addressed by better aligning 
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management compensation incentives with the long-term interests of the 
firm.  
 
Firms have incentives, and are in a better position than government 
regulators, to determine how best to align their long-term interests with 
manager compensation. Alignment is difficult to achieve, however, because 
individual firms that attempt to align incentives will be disadvantaged in 
their ability to compete for the best managers. Regulation may well be 
needed to help resolve this collective-action problem. And, because firms 
are increasingly global and top managers can move among nations, any such 
regulation would almost certainly have to be international in order to avoid 
prejudicing nations that individually require manager compensation to be 
aligned with long-term firm interests. 
    
D. Another Approach to Addressing Systemic Market Failures 
Another possible approach to addressing systemic market failures 
would be to disrupt the mechanism by which systemic shocks are 
transmitted. The problem is that there may be multiple transmission 
mechanisms, which may change over time. 
 
Nonetheless, based on a study of four financial crises in the past 
century (including the Great Depression and the recent global financial 
crisis), Professor Iman Anabtawi of UCLA and I have attempted to describe 
at least one such transmission mechanism. We argue that two otherwise 
independent correlations can combine to transmit localized economic shocks 
into broader systemic crises.   
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The first is an intra-firm correlation between a firm‟s financial 
integrity and its exposure to risk from low-probability adverse events that 
either constitute or could lead to economic shocks. The second is an inter-
institutional correlation among financial firms and markets.  
 
 Although the causes of the Great Depression are still being debated, 
these two correlations, working in combination, appear to have been 
important causal factors. Prior to the Depression, many banks engaged in 
margin lending to risky borrowers, securing the loans by shares of stock that 
the borrowers purchased with the loan proceeds. The value of the stock 
collateral started out being at least equal to the amount of the loan, and 
banks assumed that the stock market, which had been continuously rising in 
value for years, would continue to rise, or at least not decline, in value. 
 
 This illustrates the intra-institutional correlation between low-
probability risk—in this case, the risk that collateral value may become 
insufficient—and firm integrity. Bankers failed to appreciate this correlation. 
 
 The Depression also illustrates how the first correlation, in 
combination with an inter-institutional correlation among financial 
institutions (in this case, an interconnectedness among banks), can potentiate 
the transmission of an economic shock into a broader systemic shock. Some 
banks lost so much money in margin lending that they themselves became 
unable to pay their debts, including debts owed to other banks. As a result, 
defaults by margin-lending banks affected other banks‟ ability to meet their 
obligations to yet other banks, and “so on down the chain of banks and 
beyond.” 
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 Similarly, the global financial crisis almost certainly was caused, or at 
least exacerbated, by the two correlations working in combination. Subprime 
mortgage loans were bundled together as collateral to partially support the 
payment of complex mortgage-backed securities that were sold to banks and 
other financial firms worldwide. These securities maintained their value so 
long as home prices appreciated, as they had been doing for decades and as 
market observers assumed would continue. 
 
 When home prices began falling, some of these mortgage-backed 
securities began defaulting, requiring financial firms heavily invested in 
these securities to write down their value, causing these firms to appear, if 
not be, financially risky. This represented a failure of these firms to see, or at 
least to fully appreciate, the correlation between low-probability risk—the 
risk that home prices would significantly fall—and firm integrity.  
 
 The financial crisis also involved a failure to see a correlation among 
financial institutions—in this case, a failure to see not only the tight 
interconnectedness among banks and non-bank financial firms but also the 
tight interconnectedness between financial firms and markets. What made 
the financial crisis so devastating was that these failures combined to 
facilitate the transmission of economic shocks. 
 
 Professor Anabtawi and I argue that the 3Cs and the TOC, which I 
referenced at the outset of this talk, make it unlikely that market participants 
can be relied on to protect against these types of correlations combining, 
without regulatory intervention. The need for appropriate regulatory 
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intervention is urgent because increasing complexity within the financial 
system will make these correlations increasingly likely to arise, as well as to 
combine, in the future. And complexity is virtually certain to increase. Profit 
opportunities are inherent in complexity, due in part to investor demand for 
securities that more precisely match their risk and reward preferences. 
Regulatory arbitrage creates complexity, such as when market participants 
take advantage of inconsistent regulatory regimes both within and across 
national borders. And new technologies will continue to add complexity not 
only to financial products but also to financial markets. 
 
E. Subjects of Future Inquiry 
 There are not only many unresolved questions associated with 
complexity but also questions that have not been, or are only beginning to 
be, asked. One of these is whether the complexity caused by risk dispersion 
can lead to market failures that cause market participants to underestimate 
and under-protect against risk—what I call the „marginalization‟ of risk.2 I 
attempt to begin to engage this question in a new paper being work-shopped 
at LSE and Queen Mary University of London next week. If anyone is 
interested, please feel free to e-mail me, or see me after today‟s lecture, and 
I‟ll forward you a working draft. 
 
                                                 
2
 Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime 
Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 390-91 (2008) (asking whether structured 
finance dispersed subprime mortgage risk so widely that no investor had a clear incentive 
to monitor it). 
